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Figure 1 Production, Employment, Productivity, and Wages in Russian Industry,
1990–2000
The Russian transition from
socialist planning toward market-based
allocation provides an interesting
opportunity to measure the role of the
labor market in generating economic
growth. A common but relatively little
examined assumption of economists is
that employment (or labor) allocation in
market economies responds to
productivity differentials across
alternative uses, with labor tending to
flow away from lower-valued uses and
toward those that are higher-valued.
During the Soviet period, however, jobs
were allocated across industries and
enterprises according to the dictates of
central planners, who were in turn guided
by the political leaders’ preferences for
developing some sectors and types of
firms rather than others. For instance, the
mining, heavy manufacturing, and public
transportation industries received many
resources, as did larger firms and those
connected with the military, while the
consumer goods manufacturing and
service sectors, as well as smaller firms,
tended to be neglected.
How well did the Soviet planners do,
measured as the contribution of job
reallocation across firms to increased
productivity? And how has the
relationship between job and productivity
growth by industry changed since the
dramatic liberalization of markets and the
privatization of much of the economy in
the early 1990s? To what extent have the
patterns of job reallocation come to more
closely resemble those found in the
United States, and what factors tend to
increase the degree to which job
reallocation is productivity-enhancing?
Analysis of recently available data on
Russian firms provides some answers to
these questions. The data cover all
industrial enterprises in Soviet Russia in
1985–1991 and all medium- and large-
sized industrial enterprises since the
breakup of the Soviet Union in late 1991.
Firms with fewer than 100 employees are
excluded. The data, which provide
information similar to that in the U.S.
Annual Survey of Manufacturers (except
that they pertain to firms rather than
establishments), are well suited for
investigating the job reallocation process
in the old industrial sector that was
established during the socialist period.
The behavior of the old industrial firms—
where socialist planning resulted in a
large concentration of capital and skilled
labor, and where the price, technology,
and competition shocks of transition have
been particularly severe—is of particular
interest in Russia and other transition
economies.
Labor Market Developments in
Russian Industry
Figure 1 displays information on the
evolution of industrial production,
employment, labor productivity, and the
real wage in Russia from 1990 to 2000.
Although the large magnitude of the
output decline in the early 1990s must be
taken somewhat cautiously (chiefly due to
problems in measuring inflation), the
broad trends are well accepted. The
“output shock” was especially severe in
Russia, where official industrial
production fell by more than 50 percent in
just the first four years of the 1990s. The
employment decline was also quite
drastic by international and historical
standards, with a fall of nearly 40 percent
by 1998. Nevertheless, the drop in





Productivity Growth in Russia
SOURCE: Russian State Statistical Committee (Goskomstat).
Index: 1990 = 100
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basis for the Russian industrial sector
from 1985 to 1999.
Job creation is low in this sector
throughout the period, but it does rise
significantly in the later years. If the
years are grouped into a rough “pre-
reform” period (1985–1991) and a “post-
reform” period (1992–1999), the creation
rate rises from an average of 1.4 percent
in the first period to 2.4 percent in the
second. Note that the grouping of years is
defined around 1992, the year of the “big
bang” liberalization in Russia.
Job destruction exceeds creation in
every year, and it rises even much more in
the early 1990s, reaching the typical
range of the U.S. economy by 1992–
1993. The gap between destruction and
creation widens substantially, confirming
the net employment decline in the official
aggregate data. Comparing the pre- and
post-reform periods, the average job
destruction rate more than doubles, rising
from 4.5 percent to 10.3 percent. As a
consequence of the rise in both creation
and destruction, the reallocation rate also
rises, from an average of 5.9 percent in
the pre-reform period to an average of
12.7 post-reform.
of output, resulting in a large initial
decline in labor productivity followed by
a partial recovery. Measured real wages,
here deflated by the official CPI, also fell
in the years to 1995 and have been
volatile since then.
The aggregate data show a clear
picture of an industrial sector in deep
depression during the 1990s. This raises
questions concerning the nature of the
decline. Does the rapid deindustrial-
ization reflect a process of Schumpeterian
creative destruction, whereby the
economy gets rid of its over-built,
inefficient elements? Or does the
aggregate industrial decline reflect a
depression in which all economic activity
declines simultaneously and roughly
proportionately? A final possibility is
that the decline is actually more severe in
the more productive sectors of the
economy, suggesting sclerosis in an
excessive preservation of inefficient jobs
and unhealthy pressures on more
productive firms and sectors. Sclerosis is
quite plausible in Russia, where
governments (particularly local and
regional governments) may protect weak
enterprises, successful firms are subject to
public and private predation, and
stripping of assets—most likely from
productive firms with valuable assets—is
notoriously widespread. Addressing
these questions requires an analysis of
firm-level data that permit an assessment
of differences across firms and sectors in
employment and productivity growth.
Firm-Level Job Flows
The firm-level analysis follows
standard methodologies used in the
United States for measuring job creation
and job destruction, as the sources of
growth and decline in employment at the
firm level, respectively. The creation rate
is defined as the ratio of employment
growth in all expanding firms to total
employment, and the destruction rate is
the ratio of employment decline in all
contracting firms to total employment.
The reallocation rate—a measure of the
total movement of jobs across firms—is
defined as the sum of the creation and
destruction rates. Figure 2 contains
calculations of these rates on an annual
Figure 2 Job Creation and Job Destruction in Russia
SOURCE: Brown and Earle (2002).
Job Flows and Firm Characteristics
How do the patterns of job flows relate
to observable firm characteristics? In
research on the United States, a principal
focus has been on variables that may be
associated with costs of labor adjustment,
such as size, capital intensity, average
wage, and labor productivity. The general
finding has been that each of these
variables tends to reduce the magnitude of
job reallocation. Analysis of the Russian
data shows that these characteristics had
an inconsistent relationship with these
variables in the pre-reform period;
however, all of these relationships moved
strongly toward negative. This suggests
that economic reforms have produced
patterns of job flows more akin to those in
market economies, and that Russian firms
have become more sensitive to
adjustment costs.
Of particular interest in the Russian
transition are the effects of market
competition and firm ownership on job
reallocation. Employment movements
may be taken as a measure of
restructuring, which the policies of
liberalization and privatization were
intended to promote. The data, however,
show no systematic tendency for firms of
private ownership or those operating in
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innovation), an “efficient” labor market is
supposed to facilitate adjustments that
reallocate labor to raise productivity.
This study of the Russian labor market
finds that prior to reforms, when Russia
was governed by Soviet planners, the
labor market functioning was not
consistent with this textbook model. The
movement of jobs across firms and
sectors was largely unrelated to
productivity differentials. After reforms,
however, Russian labor market
performance changed drastically, and job
reallocation worked to raise productivity
growth.
Suggestions for Further Reading
Brown, David J., and John S. Earle. 2002.
“Gross Job Flows in Russian Industry
Before and After Reforms: Has Destruction
Become More Creative?” Journal of
Comparative Economics 30(1): 96–133.
Davis, Steven J., and John Haltiwanger.
1999. “Gross Job Flows.” In Handbook of
Labor Economics, Orley Ashenfelter and
David Card, eds. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp.
2711–2805.
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Research
less concentrated product markets to
engage in higher levels of reallocation.
Productivity-Enhancing Job
Reallocation
How is job reallocation related to
productivity differentials across firms?
Do less productive firms tend to lose jobs
while the more productive tend to gain
them? Or is there no relationship, or even
possibly a negative one, between job
flows and relative productivity levels?
These questions can be addressed
using a decomposition of aggregate
industrial labor productivity growth. Our
analysis of the data suggests that while
average firm productivity was falling in
the post-reform period, which may be an
artifact of overstated inflation, changes in
the composition of Russian industry
partially offset this effect. The changes in
the relative employment shares of
different industries and of firms within
industries each worked to increase
productivity by more than 2 percent per
year, on average, in the post-reform
period. Taken together, the two types of
job flows produced nearly 5 percent
annual productivity growth.
These results contrast starkly with
those for the pre-reform period, when the
estimated contributions of job flows to
productivity growth are actually negative.
The magnitudes are tiny, implying that the
reallocation of labor under Soviet
planning was largely unrelated to
productivity differentials.
Finally, what is the impact of firm
characteristics, particularly ownership and
competition, on the job flows and
productivity growth? While private
ownership and market dispersion have no
tendency to raise the level of job
reallocation, the analysis finds that they
have strong positive effects on the
relationship of reallocation with
productivity differentials. This suggests
that privatization and liberalization
policies worked to focus job destruction
in the firms and sectors that were the least
productive in the Russian economy.
Conclusion
Basic economics teaches us that a
primary function of the labor market is to
allocate labor to its highest valued uses.
In the simplest textbook case of
homogeneous labor and perfect
competition, efficiency requires that the
marginal productivity of labor be equal in
all firms and all sectors of the economy.
In response to changes in the environment
(such as shifting consumer demand,
increased competition, or technological
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